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Soldiers or Saints? 
Norwegian Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 1n 
Afghanistan 
by Lene Kristoffersen 
Introduction 
The security landscape which arose after 
the end of the Cold War brought with it 
changes in international operations' nature 
and composition. The spectrum of tasks and 
players increased, and the traditional division 
of labour and roles between military and 
civilian contributors became blurred. Gra-
dually, a more complex civil-military inter-
face emerged. By acknowledging that neither 
the military nor the civilian component could 
succeed in achieving its goals in isolation, both 
parties developed and revised concepts of 
civil-military cooperation and coordination. 
International organisations and national 
governments made incremental efforts to 
institutionalise cooperation and coordination 
between civilian and military players. Nato, 
the United Nations (UN), the European Union 
(EU) and a number of national governments 
developed civil-military cooperation and co-
ordination doctrines, policies, guidelines and 
handbooks.' Civilian organisations also issu-
The UN has developed two definitions of civil-military 
coordination. The UN Department of Peace Keeping 
Operations (DPKO) has developed one definition, 
whilst the other definition, originating from the 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
{OCHA), has a more humanitarian outlook. The 
reader is referred to Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPI\.0), Ciuii-Militury Coordi1wtion 
Policy, New '{ork, 9 September (2002) (UN [nnlinc 
10 June 2006]); and Guidelini!s 011 the Use of .Militilr)' 
1111d Cil'il De(eucc Assets to Support United Nations 
J-luma11itmian Actil'itif!s in Compfe_,: Emergencies, 
ed guidelines to be better equipped to handle 
the new, multidimensional environment of 
inrcrn;:Hional operations. 2 
Ci"il-military cooperation and coordi-
nation has been and still is subject w con-
ceptual confusion. This is due in part to the 
existing number of concepts, and in part to 
the different approaches to the same concept 
in operational theatres. The multinational 
nature of international operations gives rise 
to di fferenr mission interpretations and execu-
tions by national armed forces. Last, but not 
least, concepts of civil-military cooperation 
and coordination are torn between the 
recognition that a solid relationship between 
civilian and military players is required to 
~l.m:h (.2003) (OCHA fonline 20 June 2006]).ln 
,\\.uch .200() the African Centre for the Constructive 
Re~olurion of Disputes (ACCORD) published a 
C/AI/C 111 Ul\1 & AlricJZit Peace Opermions manual, 
(ACCORD [online 12 .May 2006]). Council of the 
Europl',H1 Union, Cil'il-milita;y Co-OfJt~ration (Cl MIC) 
conaJ!l /nr 1-:U led Crisis A1mwgement Operations 
(Bru~~eb, IS ;'>,.\arch 2002) (EU [online 20 June 2006J), 
w.h ~·ndor~ed by the EU .Military Committee through 
expiring nf the silence procedure 8 :vbrch 2002. 
2 One n:nowncd example is the Ciuil~Military 
Re/,1/wns!Jif' in Complex Emerge11cies- An IASC 
Ref~n·nce Jl.lfJer, June (2004) (ReliefWcb [online 20 
June 2006!J. This document is meant to complement 
the ( )CHA Gulddincs. The lntcr·Agcncy Standing 
Comrnith.T (1:\SC) .:omprises key UN and non-UN 
hum,mit.lri.m parrncr~. The International Committee 
of the RcJ C:nhs' (!CRC} outlook on civil-militarv 
rdarion;, i~ cl.thoratcd on in :vteinrad Studer "Th~ 
ICRC and ci\'il-military relations in armed conflict", 
lntcnwtion,t! l~cl'lf.!W of the Red Cross, \'01. 83, no. 
842 f]unc 20tli): 367~391. 
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reach respective and common goals, whilst 
this relationship is complicated and to a 
certain extent unfamiliar terrain to those 
involved. Civil-military cooperation and co-
ordination goes beyond the realms of what 
both players have traditionally defined as 
their core competencies.3 In spite of increased 
focus and conceptual developments at both 
international and national levels, civil-
military cooperation and coordination is still 
conceptually unclear and triggers a variety of 
associations in the various stakeholders.4 
In this article I shall focus on the Nato con-
cept of Civil-Military Cooperation (CJMIC).5 
CIMIC is a military tool Nato developed 
to facilitate cooperation and coordination 
between the Nato commander and civilian 
players in the operational theatre. It is seen 
as one of a number of instruments available 
that the Nato commander may use to reach 
the military mission's goals." Consequently, 
Nato CIMIC is not an end in itself.' Norway 
has adopted the concept, as one CIMIC of-
ficer emphasizes: "Norwegian CIMIC is 
Nato CIMIC, or Nato CIMIC is Norwegian 
CJMJC- that is our attitude."' 
First, I shall present and discuss the 
Nato CIMIC concept and the Norwegian 
CIMIC capability. Next, I shall examine 
in an empirical case study to what extent 
the Norwegian CJMIC unit deployed to 
Afghanistan followed the Nato CJMIC 
3 Henrik 0. Brcltcnbauch, "Transition ril statsbygging 
efrcr intervention- en ny straregisk udfordring" 
[Transition to State building after Intervention- a 
new strategic challenge], DJJS rafJfJort, Copenhagen, 
2005,13. p. 44. 
4 Rune Jcnscn, Cl MIC i fredsstottende operas/on er- en 
studie basert p/1 er/aringer fra Kosor•o [CL\UC in peace 
support operations- a study based on experiences 
from Kosovo] (Forsvnrcts Stabsskolc, 2003), p. 3, 
quoted with permission from the author. 
5 The UN has developed the concept of Civil~~'lilirary 
Coordination {CMCoord). Naco, the EU and some 
countries use Civit-iviilitnry Cooperation (CIMIC), 
and the US and some countries use Civil-~vlilitary 
Operations (0v10) and Civil Aibirs (CA). These 
concepts both differ and share similarities in their 
details. 
6 NATO International Militnry Staff (!MS), lv1C 41111 
NATO Militar)' Polic)' on Ciuii-Military Co-operation 
(Brussds, 2001 ), article 18. 
7 .Jensen, Cl MIC i lredsstnttcnde opaas;wwr ... , p. 10, 
argues chat civil-military coordination might often be 
an operational gnal to the UN. 
8 Interview, April 6, 2005 
doctrine. The Norwegian CIMIC unit contri-
buted from February 2003 to FebruarY 2004 
to the stability operation in Afgha.nistan. 
In this article I shall argue that despite the 
stated intent that Norwegian CIMIC is Nato 
CIMIC, a Norwegian approach emerged 
in Afghanistan that did not wholly concur 
with the Nato doctrine. Norwegia~ CIMIC 
had a project-oriented approach to the 
CIMIC mission that went beyond Nato's 
prescriptions. Six possible explanations for 
this lack of concurrence will be scrutinized. I 
have found that domestic political incentives 
and the Finnish CJMJC model exerted a 
strong and direct influence on the Norwegian 
CIMIC approach in Afghanistan. In the con-
clusion, I suggest that an elastic Nato CIMIC 
concept may be required so CIMIC can 
adjust to different operational realities. Yet 
an elastic CJMIC concept is challenging in 
a number of ways: how can it be combined 
with the goal of achieving unity of effort and 
a common understanding of the concept in 
the operational theatre? 9 How can the thin 
line between the military and civilian spheres 
be demarcated? 
My informants in this article are Norwe-
gian CIMIC officers, military and civilian 
ministry officials and one NGO worker, who 
give their insights into Norwegian CIMIC, 
and share facts, reflections and experiences 
of it. The interviews were performed between 
the spring of 2005 and spring of 2006. The 
CUvliC officers hold different military ranks, 
but to ensure their anonymity, they are all 
referred to as CIMIC officers. Anonymity 
was supposed to enable the informants to 
speak freely. 10 
Nato CIMIC 
War has always involved encounters between 
civil and military components, and civil-
9 "Unity of effort is essential to achieve maximum value 
from CIMIC. National and NATO CIJ\.HC activities 
in a theatre should be closely co-ordinated and de-
conflicted ... " NATO IMS, MC 41111 ... , article 16. 
10 The author has translated all interview quotes from 
Norwegian to English. Informants were given the 
opportunity eo read their quotes in English rranslation 
through. 
military cooperation may be as old as war-
fare itself. 11 However, the actual concept 
of civil-military cooperation emerged du-
ring the Second World War, when the US 
established Civil Affairs (CA), a unit respon-
sible for supporting the reconstruction of 
liberated areas." CA established and man-
aged cooperation with civilian players, con-
tributed with capacities to reconstruct infra-
structure, and provided humanitarian aid. 
CA's purpose was to enable the US armed 
forces to concentrate their efforts on the 
primary task of military combat. The US 
retained its national CA capability after the 
Second World War, and it has been and is still 
frequently employed by the US in military 
operations. u 
During the Cold War, the concepts of 'ci-
vil affairs' and 'civil-military operations' 
were developed and used by the US and UK 
in various conventionaltnilitary campaigns. 14 
Civil-military cooperation was also a natural 
ingredient in UN-led, traditional peacekeeping 
missions from the 1950s onwards, despite the 
fact that the role of civil-military cooperation 
had not been "explicitly formulated"." The 
dynamics of the civil-military relationship 
during the Second World War, bur also to 
some extent during traditional peacekeeping 
missions, may be denoted as being "top-
down", with the military in charge. Intact 
government structures on both sides of an 
inter-state conflict reduced the degree of 
interaction between peacekeepers and civilian 
popularions, and affected governments 
were also able to distribute aidY' During 
the traditional peacekeeping era before the 
late 1980s, there was no particular need for 
11 Thomas R. Mockaitis, Ciuil-mllitary cooperation in 
pe<~ce opaations: the case o{ Kosm'o (Strategic Studies 
Insrirutc, 1004 ), p. 1. 
I2 Knur-Agc Grevc and Ernst \X1• Hcrtzbcrg, Cl MIC i 
inumas;onale opemsioner [CHvliC in inrcrnarional 
operarions] {Hovedoppgavc ved Ha:rens 
Forvaltningsskole, 2001 ), p. 11. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Civil Affairs {CA} is designated personnel; Ch•il-
..'vlilitary Operations (CMO) is what they do. 
15 Ftir:,varsmakten, HOgkva.rteret, 1-!,umd/Jook Cil•ii-
}•Ailitury Co·OfJeratirm (Srockbolm, Fi)rsvarsmaktcn, 
2005). p. 3. 
J 6 SL"an Pollick, "'Civil-Military Cooperation: A new tool 
for peacckeepers", Canadian Militm-y journal (Autumn 
2000), p, 58. 
IFS Info 5/2006 7 
1 nter;lCtion between political/military and 
htllll;Jnitarian concerns.17 
The end of the Cold War saw a rise in 
inrr.1-state conflicts that altered the precepts 
for the international community's response. 
The new conflicts frequently developed into 
hum:1nitarian emergencies, and civilians 
often played the role of both main victims 
and main targets. State institutions collapsed, 
.1nd warring factions consisted nor only of 
regular armies, but also militias and armed 
ci,·ili;lns." The conflicts sparked an increase 
In civilian organisations, and 
... whereas in the Second World War 
rhe Inrernarional Committee of the Red 
Cross was the largest of a small number 
nf civilia_n aid groups, peacekeepers may 
now be taced with thousands of groups 
in ;t single theatre. 19 
The previous "top-down" relationship betwe-
en the military and the civilian population 
and authorities changed considerably. In 
traditional peacekeeping, the UN forces had 
acquired the consent of the parties to the con-
flict. In the operations of the post-Cold War, 
rhe term "spoilersn etnerged, suggesting that 
local formal or informal authorities commen-
surate a potential security threat. 20 Winning 
17 J.unt:.'> J. l.andon and Richard E. Hayes, "'National 
AppnJ.1che~ to Civii-.Milirarv Coordination in Peace 
.mJ Hum.tnit.ulan Assistan~e Operations", E11idence 
H.1scd l~cse,Jrch, Inc., Virginia (1997), (DOD 
CnrnnwnJ .md Control Research Program [online 17 
June 200.1]), p. 2. 
I 8 UnireJ l\'.uions, General Asscmblv, Fiftieth Session: 
Supplement to An Agenda for Pe;cc: Position Paper of 
the Sccret.wy-Gellt'ru/ on tbe Occusion of tbe Fiftieth 
Amm·ers<.~ry• of the United Nutions (New York: UNt 3 
J.1nu.1ry I 'J95; A/50/60; S/1995/1 ), pp. 3-4. 
19 Pollick, "Ci,·il-,\lilitary Cooperation ... ", p. 58. 
NATO, :\}1'-lJ NATO Ciuil-lvfilitary Co-opemtion 
(CL\1/C! Doctrine (Brussels, June 2003), article 802, 
identifies three types of civilian organisations. The first 
~roup comists of lnrcrnational Organizations (lOs) 
L'St.1bli~hcd by intergovernmental agreements such as 
the V;Hiou., UN organisations and the Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
Tht• ICRC .tl.,o hclongs to this group. The second 
group ctln~i-.ts nf Non-GcJVernmcntnl Organisations 
{NGO<il. lntcrnanonal and National Donnr Agencies 
~tlso belong to this group. The third group is called 
"othn groupings" which is pcn:cived to be wirhin 
the above generic types. It consists of agencies such as 
Civil inn DL•vdopment Agencies and Human Rights and 
Dcmo..:ratis;nion :\gcm:ics. . 
20 According tO Stephcn John Srcdman, ··spoiler 
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the hearts and minds of civilian populations 
was given more attention, as the support of 
the population might be " ... the Achilles heel 
of the intervention, or with a military term 
the centre of gravity" .21 International civilian 
organisations had longer-term commitments 
than the military, and did not feel obliged ro 
leave the military in charge." Consequently, 
the relationships between the military and 
various civil actors became less predictable, 
far more delicate and more intertwined. 
Nato's involvement and role in peace 
operations increased during the 1990s. 
CIMIC was not a concept new to Naro, but 
traditionally it was seen " ... as presenting 
little more than a logistic challenge" .23 In 
1999, Nato approved its new Strategic 
Concept. The aim was to equip and enable 
Nato ro be a viable player when faced with 
the new security challenges. Article 60 of the 
new Nato Strategic Concept establishes that 
"the interaction between alliance forces and 
the civil environment (both governmental 
and non-governmental) in which they operate 
is crucial to the success of operations." 
Accordingly, Nato views CIMIC as a 
potentially vital tool in achieving the end-
state of international operations.24 
Experiences from the intra-state conflicts 
in the Balkans during the 1990s prompted 
Nato to completely reexamine and revise 
CIMIC policy and doctrine. Nato ratified 
Allied joint Publication 9,A]P-9 NATO Civil-
Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine in 
May 2004.'-' The primary objective of AJP-9 
is to provide guidelines for the planning and 
Problems in Peace Processes", International Security, 
no. 2 (fall 1997), p. 5, the "' ... greatest source of risk 
comes from spoilers- leaders and parties who believe 
that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their 
power, worldvicw, and interests, and use violence to 
undermine attempts to achieve it". 
21 Nicolas T. Vcichcrts, "Samta:nkning- modsrand 
og mulighedcr" [Coordinarjon- resistance and 
possibiliticsJ, OilS Report, Copenhagen, 2006:5, p. 
17, author's translation. "Winning hearts and minds" 
implies tacitly or actively winning the support and 
trust of the national population. 
22 Pollick, "Civil-1\-lilitary Cooperation ... ", p. 59. 
23 NATO, A/1'-9 ... , article 101-1. 
24 End-state; the stated political and/or military situation 
eo be attained at the end of an operation, which 
indicates that the objective has been achieved. NATO, 
A]P-9 ... , annex B, B-3. 
15 lnrervic\\t, 13 August 2005. 
execution of CIMIC. 26 Nato CIMIC policy is 
laid down in Military Committee document 
MC 411/1, which came into force in 2001. 
l'vlost western states, Nato members in par-
ticular, broadly pursue the Nato approach to 
CIMIC though there are variations in their 
emphasis." 
Definition and purpose 
Nato defines CIMIC as follows: 
The co-ordination and co-operation, 
in support of the mission, between the 
NATO Commander and civil actors, 
including national population and local 
authorities, as well as international, 
national and non-governmental 
organisations and agencies. ~8 
CIMIC is the Nato commander's tool with 
which to build effective relationships with 
the civilian component. Nato stresses that, 
"CIMIC has to be an integral part of the entire 
operation, requiring close co-ordination with 
other military capabilities and actions. "29 
Nato CIMIC is to be executed in support 
of the military mission as part of the Nato 
commander's plan. According to Nato, 
CIMIC is applicable to both Article 5 and 
non Article 5 operations.3° CIMIC activities 
and their profile will vary depending on the 
nature of the crisis or operation. Nato CIMIC 
policy identifies a short-term and a long-term 
purpose of CIMIC: 
The immediate purpose of CIMIC is 
to establish and maintain the full co-
operation of the NATO commander 
and the civilian authorities, organi-
sations, agencies and population with-
in a commander's area of operations in 
order to allow him to fulfil his mission. 
This may include direct support to the 
implementation of a civil plan. The 
26 NATO Uv1S, MC41111 ... , article 14-a. 
27 Paul Rich, "Hearts and minds? Defining civil-military 
links globally", hrsigbt Issue, no. 39 (2002) (ld21 
insighrs [onlim-: 11 !\hy 2005]). 
28 NATO L\'lS, MC 41111..., article 4. 
19 lhiJ. article 15. 
30 NATO, AfP-9 ... , article 103-1. Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty states that an armed attack ;tgainst one 
or more of the Allies in Europe or North America sh.1ll 
be com.idered ,1n attack against all. 
long-term purpose of CIMIC is to help 
create and sustain conditions that will 
support the achievement of Alliance 
objectives in operations. 31 
This demonstrates how civil-military coope-
ration is not an end in itself, but rather an 
instrument at the disposal of the force com-
mander, to facilitate certain conditions that 
may support the commander in fulfilling 
his military mission. The wording "full co-
operation" departs from UN terminology 
and hints at stronger forms of collaboration 
between civil and military players than what 
the UN envisages. The UN definitions of Civil-
Military Coordination use "interaction" and 
''dialogue". 32 
The Nato CIMIC definition identifies 
three dimensions which constitute the 
civilian component: the national population, 
local authorities, and civilian organisations. 
The national population may be divided 
into several ethnic groups, with differing 
affiliations to the conflict. The local or 
regional authorities may comprise politicians, 
the police, religious leaders, public 
administration and so on. As the definition 
states" ... civil actors, including ... " one might 
argue that the definition also encompasses 
civilian players not explicitly mentioned. 
One such _hody might be private companies, 
which fulfil important functions in post-Cold 
War international operations by providing 
an increasing scope of provisions. Another 
important civilian player is the media. The 
definition does not differentiate between 
humanitarian and development organisations. 
These two categories of organisations are 
present at different yet at overlapping times 
of the operational cycle, operate under 
different mandates and consequently might 
require different modes of cooperation with 
the military component.33 Most humanitarian 
31 NATO IMS, MC 41111..., article 9. 
32 UN DPKO, Ciuil-Military Coordination Policy; 
OCHA, Guidelines on the Use of Military mtd Cil'il 
De/cw:c Assets ... However, the OCHA definition, 
ibid., p. 5, states that "basic strategies range from 
coexisrcnce to eo operation,.,. 
33 The UN DPKO definition takes this into account: 
"UN Civil-i\lilirary Coordination is the system of 
interaction, involving exchanges of information, 
negotiation, dc-conflicrion, mutual supporr, and 
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organisations strive to abide bv rhe humani-
tarian . principles. of humani;y, neutrality, 
lmparttahty and mdependence, whilst some 
development organisations might be more 
politically integrated into the overall internati-
onal operation. 34 
T_he term "in support of the mi-.;sion '' is 
crucwl to the definition. The Naro Cl.\ tiC 
doctrine states that Nato forces will, when 
cooperating with a wide range of ..:il'ilian 
bodies, 
... as far as possible and within milit.HY 
means and capabilities, accommoJ.u~· 
and support rhe activities of these hodtl'S, 
provided this does not compromi~e the 
mission.35 
"Mission primacy" is one basic prin~.:iple in 
the Nato CIMIC concept, and mirrors •'in 
support of the mission". The dcfinition,ll 
term and related principle require furrhcr 
elaboration. A study conducted under the 
auspices of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (!CRC) suggests rhat the 
military experiences gained in the Balkans 
" I d . 
... resu te m a new tone being adopted in 
military circles concerning their involvement 
in humanitarian work".36 The new tone was 
that of "mission primacy", where" ... the mili-
tary aspect of a mission should always take 
precedence over any humanitarian aciion" _F 
The study welcomed this development, con-
tinuing to state that, " ... the view that a 
soldier should dedicate himself above all 
to his primary role appears to be regaining 
ground" .38 According to the study, the UN 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia 
is the most prominent example of the 
military being more involved in activities of 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
planning at nU levels between militarv elements 
and humanitarian organizations, dev~lopment 
organizations, or the local civilian population, to 
achieve respective objectives". Ibid., arriclc 8. 
The seven fundamental principles of the Red 
Cross and Re-d Cresce-nt arc humanity. imp;1rtiallty, 
neutrality, independence, vohmtal)" ~cr\'kc. unity, and 
universality. Nicolas T. Veichcrrs makes a case for 
differentiating between the two sets of organis,ltions in 
"'Samtxnkning ... ", p.26. 
NATO, A]l'-9 ... , article HJ2-2c. 
Srudcr, "The ICRC and civil-military relations ... ", p. 
Jn. · 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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a humanitarian nature than with restoring 
peace." This might explain why Nato was 
eager to avoid "'1nission creep'~, or " ... the 
tendency for a force to begin taking on tasks 
perceived as civilian", when Implementation 
Force (!FOR) was launched in Bosnia in 
1995.'0 
Consequently, the principle of mission 
primacy might have been the result of 
previous experiences of mission creep. At the 
same time, defining which activities are in 
support of the mission and which may not be 
is complex, and the transition might be very 
elusive. further, how is CIMIC to execute 
mission primacy without bypassing civilian 
players? As one observer remarks: "In effect, 
it I CIMIC] is not a proposal for a genuine 
'partnership' of equals. " 41 Nato claims that 
"CIMIC implies neither military control of 
civilian organisations nor the reverse. "42 How 
Nato executes CIMIC in the field may hint 
at how different concerns are weighted. The 
British have developed a CIMIC definition 
that excludes "in support of the mission".'' 
An analyst compared the UK concept with 
Nato CIMIC, and asked 
... whether this represents an invita-
tion to mission creep, or is it simply a 
sensible recognition that the narrow 
cornpartmentalisation of the military 
mission is now profoundly outdated? 
Further: 
Does the British definition open up 
for the possibility of a more genuine 
form of partnership with all elements 
of the NGO community than the Nato 
definition and how will this be achieved 
in practical terms? 44 
39 Ibid., p. 374. 
40 Espcn Banh Eidc, "Peacekeeping past and present", 
Nato re11iew, Web edition, Vol. 49- No. 2 Summer 
(2001:', (Nato [online 18 November 2003J). The 
precise meaning of "mission creep" is still unsettled, 
and the concept is to a certain degree contested. 
4 I Stuart Gordon, "Understanding the Priorities for 
Civil~,\·lilitary Co-operation (CIMIC)", The journal of 
Hummrit,Jrii111 Assistmtce, .July (20()1 ), [onlinc 30 1\Iay 
2006], p. 9. 
41 NATOIMS. MC 41111..., "rriclc 11. 
43 Gonion, "Understanding the Priorities ... ", p. 9. 
44 !hid. 
A recent example of CIMIC seeming to 
cross the line from efforts "in support of 
the mission" to solving civilian tasks uncon-
nected to the principle of mission primacy 
is the Danish CIMIC efforts in Iraq. In 
the Danish sector in Iraq, the originally 
purely military CIMIC efforts developed in-
to a mission solving several civilian tasks 
- it even changed name to Rebuilding Unit 
Denmark.45 Such developments give rise to 
a numher of questions. How can we decide 
which activities are in support of the military 
mission and which are not? What does the 
transition from CIMIC to Rebuilding Unit 
Denmark tell us about the CIMIC concept? 
Some might argue that all civil/humanitarian 
activities are in support of the military mission 
and such questions are inextricably linked to 
the concept of CIMIC. The CIMIC concept 
the EU endorses seems to deflect from the 
Nato CIMIC doctrine on the prevalence of 
the military mission, as seen in the following 
EU description of the guiding principle of 
mission primacy: 
The mandate and the resulting 
mission of any EU-led CMO [Crisis 
Management Operation] take priority 
in all circumstances. If in exceptional 
circumstances however1 additional 
CIMIC related tasks are to be assumed, 
it should be done after the prioritisation 
of the military tasks and an assessment 
of the necessary resources in co-
ordination with civilian agencies.46 
The EU CIMIC concept provides a window 
of opportunity, where "additional CIMIC 
related tasks" may be assumed in exceptional 
circumstances. The purpose of Nato CIMIC 
stipulates that direct support to a civil plan 
might have ro be included to solve the 
military mission. Nato CIMIC also allows 
for the military to take on civilian tasks, but 
only in exceptional circumstances, " ... where 
rhe appropriate civil body is not present 
or is unable to carry our its mandate and 
where an otherwise unacceptable vacuum 
45 Vcichcrrs, "'Samta:nkning ... ", pp. 38-9. 
46 Council of the European Union, Ciuil-militar)' 
Co-operation (CIA1IC) concept for EU led Crisis 
Mmwgement Operatious, p. 13. 
would arise" .47 Nato stresses that support to 
the implementation, or possible execution, 
of civilian tasks by the military are to be 
carried out with a view to timely transition 
to appropriate civilian bodies.'' Both Nato 
and the EU envisage that ClM!C might be 
engaged in non-military tasks in the civilian 
sector. The difference seems to be that the EU 
regards such engagements as being possibly 
exempt from the principle of mission primacy, 
whilst Nato regards such exceptional engage-
ments to be executed in support of the mili-
tary mission." A pressing requirement is to 
decide which circumstances should allow for 
military engagements in the civilian sector. 
The guiding principle of Nato ClMlC is that 
CIMJC may take on civilian tasks if vacuums 
are identified in which appropriate civilian 
players are unable to carry out the tasks due, 
for example, to security concerns. 
Principles 
Nato CIMIC is governed by two categories of 
principles and the first set of principles relates 
to the military direction."' In this category, 
the first principle is that of mission primacy, 
which has been examined. The second prin-
ciple is that of command direction. This 
implies that military commanders are res-
ponsible for directing CIMIC activities, 
achieving unity of effort and securing military 
effectiveness. The third principle is economy 
and implies that military commanders must 
try to avoid using military assets on non-
military tasks and civilian dependence on 
militar;• resources. The fourth principle is 
prioritisation and concentration, which im-
plies that military resources should not be 
dissipated, but concentrated on tasks of the 
highest priority. The final principle relating 
to the military direction of CIMIC consists 
47 NATO L\lS, MC41111 ... , acticlc ll·b. 
48 NATO, A}P-9 ... , article 102-ld. 
49 This i~ a matter of interpretation. The EU CL\1IC 
doctrine is vcrv much influenced bv the Nato doctrine, 
and the wordi~g is often similar. );et Nata seems to be 
more rigid and explicit on rhe prevalence of mission 
primacy; than the EU doctrine. This might give rise to 
confusions, given that 19 coumrit:s are members of 
borh organisations. 
50 NATO, .4]1'·9 .... article 202. 
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of lef\al obligations and humanitarian consi-
derations, i.e. stressing the importance of 
compliance with international law and the 
l..rw of Armed Conflict. 
The second category of principles governs 
the civil-military relationship. 51 The first prin-
ciple is cultural awareness, which entails 
the military having to form a sound under-
sunding of local culture, customs and laws. 
The second princi pie underlines that objec-
tiH·s shared by Nato forces and civilian 
Drf\.lnisations should, wherever possible, be 
est.rhlished and recognised. Third, the ana-
lysis of common objectives should lead to 
;111 agreed sharing of responsibilities. The 
fourth principle governing civil-military 
relations is that every effort should be made 
ro secure consent, i.e. the willing cooperation 
of civilian organisations. The fifth principle 
is that Cl.'v11C tasks and activities should be 
transparent, and the final principle under-
scores the necessity of maintaining open and 
consto:lllt communication. 
The rwo categories of principles reflect 
upon rhe mission primacy discussion above. 
Principles relating to the military direction of 
CL\ tiC might not necessarily be harmonizable 
with certain principles governing the 
civil·military relationship. For instance, 
transparency and open communication 
might not necessarily combine well with 
the principles of military direction. Mission 
primacy and military effectiveness could 
imply that ClMIC officers must allow 
information they have gathered to be used 
for intelligence purposes. Yet CIMIC officers 
may be reluctant to assume a certain degree 
of affiliation with the intelligence branch, 
and they may he anxious that this might 
jeopardize their relationship with civilian 
bodies. In fact, the Nato CIMIC doctrine 
states that 
Cllv!IC personnel will be a valuable 
source of local information... bur 
rhey will rapidly become ineffective 
if used for collecting information for 
intelligence production ... 52 
51 !hid ... midc 103. 
51 NATO, A]/'-9 ... , artick 203-5. 
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The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (JCRC) study points out that " ... the 
question of information-gathering is a central 
issue in the relationship between military 
and humanirarian work", and poses certain 
questions, such as: 
To what extent should the ICRC be able 
ro benefit from information provided by 
military sources? Conversely, what type 
of information could the ICRC give tbe 
military if so requested? 
Information sharing is one example of chal-
lenges CJMIC officers might face on the 
ground, where theN a to CJMIC doctrine does 
not offer explicit guidance. Consequently, the 
CIMIC officers will be required to demon-
strate good judgment on a situational basis. 
Returning to the purpose and definition of 
Nato CIMIC, CIMIC is intended to set up 
mechanisms for cooperation between military 
and civilian players so the Nato commander 
can fulfil his military mission. The imperative 
question to a CJMIC officer operating in the 
field and faced with specific conditions is thus: 
"How does this course of action support the 
military mission?" 
Execution ol Nato CIMIC 
The Nato CJMJC doctrine identifies a 
number of CIMIC tasks and certain core 
functions that CIMIC is intended to fulfil in 
an operational theatre to achieve its purpose. 
To a certain extent, these tasks differ between 
Article 5 and non Article 5 operations. 53 The 
focus in this section will be on the non Article 
5 application of Nato CJMJC to identify how 
Nato prescribes the execution of CIMIC in 
the stabilisation operation in Afghanistan. 
The tasks Nato assigns to CJMIC are 
53 Ibid., article 3()3-la states char: "!Vtany NATO nations 
have their own structures and procedures in place 
to deal with most aspects of CIMIC in the event of 
military conflict ... Support tO the civil environment 
will be a national responsibility ... Even where a NATO 
nation has been subjected to significant destruction 
as a result of invasion, it is assumed that the national 
government will retain both the will and ability to 
org;1nise and carry out civil reconstruction of the 
country, supported by international organizations ... 
Nonetheless, ClMJC is as crucial to the Commander in 
rh is scenario as any other staff function." 
grouped into three overlapping stages, the 
pre-operational stage, the operational stage 
and the transitional stage. The activities at 
the operational stage are the most relevant 
for the empirical purposes of this article, 
so I shall only mention the activities at the 
other stages in brief. At the pre-operational 
level, CJMIC staff is intended ro be involved 
in planning, education and training. CIMIC 
staff will pursue integrated planning with 
civilian parrners, and try to incorporate civil 
related factors into the planning of other 
staff branches.54 At the operational level, 
six specific tasks are identified.·" The first 
is communication, where Nato prescribes 
proactive and constant communication at 
all levels. The second task is information ex-
change, which is likely to go in both directions. 
The third is coordination, stipulating Nato 
CJMIC coordinate with civilian players but 
also secure coordinated CIMIC efforts within 
an operational theatre.56 The fourth task is 
to facilitate agreements necessary to support 
civil-military cooperation. The fifth concerns 
conducting CIMIC activities to fill identified 
critical vacuums. The sixth task involves 
conducting continuous assessments, which 
will form the basis for the other five tasks. 
Finally, the transitional stage is, according 
to the Nato CIMIC doctrine, intended to 
facilitate 
... the hand-over, in as smooth and 
seamless manner as possible, of civil 
related activities to the proper, mandated 
authorities.s'' 
The six CIMIC tasks Nato prescribes in the 
operational stage are expected to bring about 
the fulfilment of the three core functions 
of CIMIC. 58 The first core function is civil-
military liaison, which should provide the 
coordination necessary to facilitate and sup-
port the planning and conduct of operations 
54 NATO, A]P-9 ...• article 302-1. 
55 Ibid., article 302-3. 
56 Internal coordination is also a challenge to the civilian 
component. A number of projects have been launched 
to improve civilian coordination and professionalism, 
such as the Sphere Project and the Humanitarian 
Ombudsman Proj~.ocr. 
57 NATO, A}P-9 ... , article 301-4. 
58 Ibid., article 104-1. 
at all levels. Liaison is the most important 
core function and implies connections being 
established via the creation of communication 
structures and channels. The second core 
function is support to the civil environment 
and covers a number of CIMIC activities and 
may involve a range of military resources, e.g. 
information, personnel, materiel, equipment, 
communications facilities, specialist expertise 
or training. The third core function is 
support to the force and acknowledges that 
Nato commanders to varying degrees will 
depend on different kinds of civilian support 
from within the operational theatre, such 
as civilian resources, information, and tacit 
civilian support for military operations. Nato 
views CJMJC as playing an essential role in 
obtaining such support. 
One CIMIC officer stressed that various 
interpretations are possible within the given 
frameworks. 59 Military doctrines 
... will seldom be specific and detailed 
but rather broad and general to 
allow for improvisation and adapta· 
tion in accordance with the special 
circumstances of each conflict. 60 
The Nato CIMIC doctrine prescribes an 
elastic CIMIC concept, which can be adjus-
ted to situational requirements. Nato CIMIC 
officers on the ground in the various opera-
tional theatres are equipped with a Nato 
CIMIC doctrine to guide them in their 
mission. However, the Nato CIMIC doctrine 
contains aspects which may conflict with one 
another and this might oblige the CIMIC 
officer to rely on his or her own judgment in 
a particular situation. However, Nato prescri-
bes mission primacy to be the basic parameter. 
The doctrine envisages a CIMIC capability 
which can build effective relationships with 
the civilian component, and positions CIMIC 
as a bridge-builder between the military and 
the civilian components.61 The Naro CIMIC 
59 
60 
61 
Interview, 6 April2005. 
Hennin~-A. Frantzen, NATO ,md Peace Support 
Opemti"ons, 1991-1999: policies and doctrines (C:ass 
series on peacekeeping: 20, London: frank Cass, 
20()5,1, p. 4. 
A great deal of the literature on ci\•il-military 
cooperation and coordination focus on the relationship 
between the military and civilian organisations. This is 
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purpose is to be accomplished by fulfilling the 
three core functions of civil-military liaison, 
support to the civil environment and support 
to the force. 
Nato CIMIC faces challenges in the inter-
face between military and civilian Jom<lins. 
One challenge is the level of involvement in ci-
vil related tasks. And how is Nato C:I.\!IC to 
bring together mission primacy anJ an actual 
partnership with civilian players? Is an equal 
partnership a possible or even a desirable ~oal 
to military players? Before exarninin~ how 
the Norwegian CIMJC unit in Af~h.1ni't<ln 
reconciled an Afghan operatioi!<ll theatre 
with the Nato CIMIC concept, I shall present 
the Norwegian CIMIC capability. for :-J.Jto 
to achieve a dedicated CLMIC capability, the 
organisation relied on the member st.Hes to 
develop national CIMJC capabilities. 
The Norwegian CIMIC capability 
To execute CIMIC according to the pres-
criptions of A.JP-9, Naro depends on devel-
oping a dedicated CIMIC capability. Acwr-
ding to Nato, such a capability should con-
sist of three components. First, a CIMIC 
capability should consist of a conceptual 
aspect encompassing policy, doctrine and 
concepts. Second, Nato needs to develop a 
common understanding and ability to pur 
doctrine into practice through training, 
education, exercises and general awareness. 
Finally, a physical capacity is required." 
Nato suggests that the physical capacity 
required to complete CIMIC tasks varies 
from situation to situation, but a minimwn 
requirement would be CIMIC staff integrated 
into headquarters at all levels.63 One asset 
of the physical capacity might be CIMIC 
Groups, trained to conduct CIMIC activities 
such as making assessments and establishing 
CIMIC centres.64 The following examination 
nor to suggest rhar military cooperation and relations 
with the national population and local authorities ;uc 
less essential ro Naro and the militarv mission. 
61 NATO, A.JP-9 ... , article tOS. . 
63 Ibid., <trti~lc 501-1. 
64 CUvUC Coordination Centres are an important part 
of the CI!\UC concept. The doctrine stares: "Cil\HC 
centres arc locations where liaison and exchange 
of information between military personnel, civilian 
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of the Norwegian CIMIC capability focuses 
mainly on how ir appeared upon deployment 
to Afghanistan in 2003, bur also briefly on 
more recent developments. 
Conceptual aspect 
Norwegian CIMIC is based on the Nato 
CIMIC doctrine, and Norway was an active 
participant in the forming of the Nato 
CIMIC doctrine. According to one ministry 
informant, "The A.JP-9 gained Norwegian 
approval. We were parr of the making and 
are content with the result.""' No written 
Norwegian CIMIC handbooks or guidelines 
have been produced. It has been and still is an 
intention and a goal to produce a handbook or 
guidelines, but so far this has not been done, 
mainly due to a lack of personnel resources. 66 
At the same time the "Norwegian CIMIC is 
Nato CIMIC" attitude has probably not ac-
celerated this process. When the Norwegian 
CIMIC unit was established, it was asked 
whether documents such as a handbook 
and guidelines should be made. As it had 
been settled that Norwegian CIMIC would 
be based on Nato Cll'v!IC, some questioned 
whv rime should be invested in producing 
Norwegian documents." A Norwegian hand-
book or guidelines would arguably simplify 
rhe challenge of communicating what CIMIC 
really is, both within the military organi-
sation internally and externally to civilian 
parrners. By staking our a Norwegian 
CIJ'v!IC path, Norwegian guidelines might 
also alleviate the confusion of experiencing 
quire dissimilar national approaches to the 
Naro CIMIC doctrine in the field. On the 
other hand, national concepts and guidelines 
might further impede efforts to create an 
international consensus on what the concept 
organisations and the local aurhoritics and population 
rakes pbce.'" The key functions of CL\HC centres 
are to a) Provide initial points of contact; b) Provide 
a focal pnim for liaison; c) Facilitate information 
exchange; d) Provide advice on the ;:wailability 
and mechanics of milirary assistance to ciYilian 
organisations; and e) RcHcnforce the legitimacy of 
rh~ Force in the eves of civil authorities and the local 
population. NATO, A]P-9 ... , article 502-3. 
65 Interview, 20 ivlay 2005. 
66 Interview, 6 April 2005. 
67 Interview, 3 .ivttrch 2006. 
of CJMIC should consist of. 
The joint operational doctrine of the 
Norwegian armed forces, published in 2000, 
is not up-to-date or relevant to CIMIC." The 
doctrine briefly identifies successful civil-
military cooperation as being important on 
three accounts: first as an important force-
multiplier; secondly for the contact with 
the civilian environment, and thirdly as an 
indirect means of force-protection. Further, 
the doctrine emphasises that successful 
civil-military cooperation is dependent on 
the existence of an overarching strategy, 
and integration with all other activities.'" 
Such political incentives and an overarching 
strategy behind CIM!C work in the Balkans 
seem ro have been lacking. One srudy 
concludes that: 
Our inquiries have not established 
whether the Norwegian government 
has any kind of vision, intention, policy 
or goal for civil-military cooperation in 
a peace support operation. The political 
agenda seems to be missing. :o 
This conclusion appears to be supported by 
another study: 
Despite increased emphasis on inter-
national operations and a general 
acceptance at political and military 
professional levels of the importance 
of civil-military cooperation in inter-
national operations, this is not reflected 
in the Norwegian approach to such 
operations. Lacking statistical evidence, 
I will claim that Norwegian (civil and 
militarv) efforts in the Balkans are not 
co-ordinated. 71 
The joint operational doctrine launches a 
68 jcnsen, Cl MIC i {redsstottende opcrasjO!n>r ... , p. 30. 
69 Forsvarcts Overkommando, Forsl'arets FcllesofJertttil•e 
Doktrine Del B [Joint Operational Doctrine of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces Port B], (Forsvarcrs 
Ovcrkommando, February 2000), p. 136. 
70 Grcve and Hcrtzeberg, Cl .MIC i i11tenwsjouale 
opemsjoner, p. 21, authors translation. 
71 Bjnrn Ingc Rusct, "Utfordringer for sivil-militxrt 
samarbeid i et frcmridig forsvar" [Challenges to civil-
military cooperation in on armed force of rhc future], 
in Bjnrn Ingc Rusct, cd., Militamnaktseminaret 2000-
{orsl'aret L•t:d et J!eiskillc, Conference Proceedings from 
Nonvegian Institute for lnrernarional Affairs (2001 ), p. 
107, authors translation. 
general interest in developing a national 
policy for civil-military cooperation, and 
specifically to facilitate cooperation with 
foreign ministry representatives in operational 
theatres to improve the coordination of 
Norwegian efforrs.72 CJMIC deployments 
have necessitated a dialogue between the 
Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. In Afghanistan a national 
policy for civil-military cooperation would 
have been less relevant, as the Norwegian 
CJMJC unit was not integrated into a Nor-
wegian contingent, and there were no Norwe-
gian civilian organisations present in the 
Norwegian area of operations.73 
As a final point, the joint operational 
doctrine uses "civil-military cooperation" 
to refer to both CJMJC in international ope-
rations and civil-military cooperation in a 
Norwegian total-defence context. This might 
cause conceptual confusion from a Nor-
wegian perspective.74 Despite certain basic 
common features, these two concepts should 
not be mixed up. As of 2006, a new doctrine 
is underway and could play an important 
part in conveying the conceptual aspect of 
CIMIC. 
Traillillg, education, exerctses and general 
awareness 
The second component Nato identifies as part 
of a CJMJC capability is the development 
of a common understanding and ability to 
72 For_o;varcts 0\'crkommando, Forsl'arets Fellesoperatiue 
Doktrine Del B, p. 136. 
73 The UN "integrated missions" concept might become 
increasingly influential and spur developments. Espcn 
Barth Eide et al., Report 011 Integrated .Missions 
(2005): Practical Perspecth'es and Recommendations, 
Independent Study for the Expanded UN, ECHA Core 
Group, (2005). 
74 The Norwegian "total defence" concept is based on 
rhc principle of being able ro mobilise the collective 
resources of the nation if Norway or N-aro were 
attacked. Recently the concept of "total defence" has 
been integrated into a wider perspective with rhe label 
"civil-military cooperation", incorporating the need 
for a comprehensive utilization of ci\·ilian and military 
resources m maintain Norwegian security and national 
imerests. The reader is referred to ~v1iniHry of Defence, 
St. prp. nr. 45 (2000<2001) Omleggingen ,w Pom•an!l 
i penoden 2002-2005 [White Paper 45 (2000-200 I) 
The reorganisation of the Armed Forces in the period 
2001-1005]. 
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put doctrine into practice through trammg, 
education, exercises and general awareness. 
The Norwegian armed forces had its first 
serious encounter with CIMIC in Implemen-
tation Force (!FOR) in Bosnia in 1995-96.75 
Hence CIMIC ought to be regarded ;ls a quite 
newconcepttoNorwegian military personnel. 
An observer concludes, based on intnviews 
with Norwegian military personnel serving 
in Kosovo, that, "In general there "·c·meJ to 
be no common understanding of rhe concept 
among Norwegian personnel.,., A number 
of impediments to CIMIC execution were 
identified, such as a lack of extensive ex-
perience in the Norwegian officers perform-
ing CIMJC functions, unsatisfactury pre-
deployment education and training .l!ld the 
lack of written guidelines and hanJhooks.--
The Norwegian CIMIC personnel sen·ing in 
Afghanistan had more CJMIC experience, 
education and training than the Norwegian 
officers performing CJMIC tasks in Koso\"0. 
All the CJMJC informants had participated 
in at least one international military opera-
tion prior to Afghanistan, and they also haJ 
experience from CJMJC work, though per-
haps under another name, though performing 
similar functions. 
Intensive pre-deployment training of the 
Norwegian CIMIC officers who served in 
Afghanistan was conducted both abroad 
and in Norway. All the CJMIC informants 
had attended, or served as instructors on 
CJMIC courses abroad. CIMIC Group 
North, Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for 
Military Peace Support (NORCAPS) and the 
Finnish armed forces arranged courses.78 The 
Norwegian CIMIC officers also received pre-
deployment training in Norway before going 
to Afghanistan. There is still a lack of specific 
CIMIC courses at the Military Academy and 
the Norwegian Defence Staff College. As 
CIMIC competencies and experiences develop 
75 Grcve and Hcrtzcberg, Cl MIC i intemasjon11/e 
oper.1sjom:r, p. 11. 
76 Svcn Kristian Nis!ien, Norwegian Security Polic)• and 
the Norwegi<lll Armed Fnrccs iu the 21. Century•- 11 
case study of KFOR (University of Oslo, 2002), p. 74. 
77 Ibid., p. 73. 
78 The Finnish arranged courses due to their command 
of the International Sc~.:urity Assistance ForcL' (IS An 
CI.~-·HC branch from August 2003. 
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within the Norwegian military organisation, 
there is reason to believe that CIMIC will be 
given more attention in Norwegian officers' 
education. 
The third Norwegian CIMIC detachment 
had the advantage of having participated in 
the field exercise 'Nordic Peace' in Finland 
before being deployed to Afghanistan. Hence 
they had acquired experiences from the 
exercise and CIMIC education before deploy-
ment. There seems to be a growing awareness 
of the importance of CIMIC in training. One 
CIMIC officer emphasised that the NATO 
exercise Battle Griffin in the winter of 2004 
was the first exercise in Norway with the 
participation of specific CIMIC teams. 79 
The understanding of the CIMIC concept 
in the Norwegian armed forces has been, 
and perhaps still is, somewhat confused. 
According to one CIMIC officer, " ... it 
was first as we arrived in Afghanistan that 
we have been doing CIMIC on a greater 
scale"."' This experience is likely to add to 
the general awareness of CIMIC, combined 
with increased attention in training and 
education, and the potential development of 
a Norwegian handbook and a more relevant 
joint operational doctrine. Nevertheless, 
there is probably some way left to go. "Does 
everybody understand what CIMIC really is?" 
asked one of rhe CIMIC officers rhetorically." 
The answer would seem to be "no". Another 
Cliv!IC officer remarked: "Many perceive 
CLvllC as a military NGO, both civilians and 
actually also military personnel. Still there 
are great misconceptions as to what CIMIC 
really is. "H2 
Physical capacity 
Norway acted upon the request from Nato, 
and made a commitment to establish a 
Cliv!IC unit operational as of 1 January 
2003. The Norwegian CIMIC unit consis-
ted of three CIMIC elements. Initially, and 
during the Norwegian CIMIC deployment 
to Afghanistan, the unit belonged admini-
79 Interview, 6 April 2006. 
SO Interview, 6 April 2005. 
SI Interview, 13 Nlny :!005. 
82 Imcn·icw, 6 April 1005. 
stratively to the army's reaction force. 83 All 
three elements had 16 CIMIC officers on 
readiness contracts signed for a period of 
two to three years, in addition to a leading 
element consisting of four ClMIC officers. 
This amounts to 52 officers on contracts 
ready to deploy in 30 days. Consequently, the 
armed forces had CIMlC officers prepared 
at any time for deployment to international 
operations." The CIMIC unit was originally 
lead by a lieutenant colonel and established 
as a section at the Norwegian Defence Staff 
College (NODSC).85 Four lieutenant colo-
nels and a civilian social anthropologist ran 
the daily work. They held CIMIC briefings 
at the NODSC, and functioned as a centre 
for CIMlC competence. However, due to the 
reorganisation of the NODSC, the CIMIC 
section there has been closed down, with only 
one CIMIC position remaining. The CIMIC 
positions have been moved to other parts of 
the military organisation, such as the army's 
transformation and doctrine-command." 
The administrative responsibility for the unit 
was transferred to the army in December 
2005, after a period of unclear divisions of 
responsibility.'7 
The Nato requirement to establish 
a dedicated CIMIC capability led the 
Netherlands, Germany, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark and Norway to establish 
CIMIC Group North in 2001.'" The group 
was intended to function as a multinational 
CIMIC unit, ready to be deployed to 
international operations. CIMIC Group 
North was activated in January 2003, with 
its headquarters located in the Dutch city of 
Budel. 89 The membership of the Group was 
83 The army's reaction force [Forsvarcts lnnsatsscyrkc 
Hxr, FIST-H] was dosed down in .2004. 
84 Lars Hojem Kvam, "'De 51 gode hjclpcrne.., [The 52 
good helpers], Forsuarets Forum, nr. 13 (2002), p. 14. 
85 Forsvarecs Stabsskolc (FSTS). 
86 [Horrcns trnnsformasjons- og doktrinekommando 
(TRADOK)[, authors translation. Interview, 6 April 
2005. 
87 .iVlarius Eibak Lauritscn, "CI~HC overfort til ha:.-ren" 
(CLVHC transferred to the army], Forst•arsnett (2006) 
[onlinc 12 February 2006]. 
88 Italy, Greece, Portugal, Turkey and Hungary are 
members of CIA-ilC Group South with headquarters in 
Italy, operational as of late 2003. 
89 Imcrvicw, 23 September 2005. 
important to the decision to contribute with 
the Norwegian CIMIC unit to Afghanistan. 
As one CIMIC officer claimed: 
We contributed with CIMIC because 
we were in the establishing phase of 
CIMIC Group North, and it was a wish, 
a request from Nato to these different 
counrries to contribute with CIMIC.'·)0 
In November 2004 the CIMIC Group North 
nations agreed to transform CIMIC Group 
North into a multinational CIMIC Centre of 
Excellence. 
The Norwegian CIMIC environment has 
rhus experienced a period of high activity 
during the establishment of the CIMIC unit, 
membership in CIMIC Group North with 
two Norwegian positions in the CIMIC 
Group North headquarters, the deployment 
to Afghanistan in 2003-04 and the activities 
of the CIMIC section at the Norwegian 
Defence Staff College. After having moved 
closer to creating a professional CIMIC 
milieu, the ongoing transformation process 
of the Norwegian armed forces caused some 
setbacks, as CIMIC " ... fell between two 
chairs 1', and lost its momentum due, for 
example, to unclear divisions of responsibili-
rv.91 Another setback is the fact that Norway 
has opted to discontinue its participation in 
the new CIMIC Centre of Excellence, due to 
the reduction of the number of positions to be 
held bv the Norwegian armed forces abroad. 
This ~ill probably make Norway less able to 
keep up with developments." Nevertheless, 
it seems that Norway is incrementally 
progressing towards a dedicated CIMIC ca-
pability as described in the Nato CIMIC doc-
tnne. 
The Norwegian approach to CIMIC in 
Afghanistan 
Norwegian CIMIC is in principle based on 
the Naro doctrine. However, a Norwegian ap-
proach to Cllvl!C emerged in Afghanistan that 
in some respects did not concur with the Naro 
90 Interview, 6 Apri12005. 
91 Laurilscn, "CIMIC ovcriOrt til Jucrcn". 
91 Interview, 3 ~larch 2006. 
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doctrine. The Norwegian approach may be de-
noted as being "project-oriented" CIMIC and 
this label has two main implications. First, 
projects increasingly became the main activi-
ty of the Norwegian CIMIC-elements, though 
this does not necessarily conflict with the Nato 
CIMIC doctrine. Se~ondly, in facilitating 
and implementing projects, the focus of the 
Norwegian CIMIC elements seem to have 
been gradually disconnected from mission 
primacy and the definitional requirement 
that CIMIC be executed in support of the 
mission. By moving into the realm of civilian 
activities in Afghanistan without a constant, 
comprehensive and conscious view of mission 
primacy, the Norwegian CIMIC unit diverged 
from the Nato doctrine in its execution of the 
miSSIOn. 
Afghanistan was confirmed as a Nato top 
priority at the Nato summit in Istanbul in.J une 
2004. Afghanistan is also a main priority for 
Norwegian military commitments abroad. 
In accordance with the Bono Agreement, the 
UN Security Council passed a resolution on 
20 December 2001 authorizing the deploy-
ment of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) to Kabul and its surroumling 
areas." Nato assumed the command of ISAF 
in August 2003. What makes the case of 
Afghanistan particularly interesting is the 
fact that this was the first time Norway had 
contributed with specific CIMIC elements. 
Previously, such as in the Balkans, CIMIC 
was an integrated part of a larger Norwegian 
force. 94 In the following sections, I shall 
outline the assignment and execution of 
Norwegian CIMIC in Afghanistan. 
The Norwegian CIMIC unit was offered 
to Nato in the fall of 2002 and the Ministry 
of Defence was responsible for identifying 
and assigning the Norwegian CIMIC unit 
to ISAF. 95 The Norwegian Defence Staff and 
the Norwegian Joint Headquarters were 
responsible for implementing the Norwegian 
93 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1386 
(2001). 
94 Imcrview, 20 May 1005. 
95 Interview, 20 l\lay 2005, and c-mail correspondence 
with ivlinistrY of Defence official, 13 .1\Ltv 2005 and 20 
July 2005. . . 
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CIMIC mission in Afghanistan."" Three 
CIMIC elements comprised the Norwegian 
CIMIC unit. The first element was deployed 
in February 2003, and the mission was 
terminated in February 2004 upon the re-
turn of the third element. Accordingly, 
Norwegian CIMIC had three rotations, and 
each element was deployed for a period of 
four months. Each element consisted of two 
CIMIC teams with six CIMIC officers in 
each team. In addition, each element had a 
commanding officer and an administrative 
officer. Approximately half of the officers 
were army professionals, whilst the rest were 
reserve officers with civilian occupations. 
CIMIC element one and two had female 
CIMIC officers, whilst element three did not. 
The Norwegian CIMIC elements were bar-
racked at the engineer camp of ISAF Kabul 
Multinational Brigade, Camp Framheim. 
During the one-year period of the Nor-
wegian deployment, several countries made 
CIMIC contributions to ISAF. Finland and 
Sweden contributed with six teams each, 
Norway and Germany had two teams, the 
UK one team and, in addition, Italy, Spain, 
the Netherlands and Turkey deployed CIMIC 
teams in the period. 97 Furthermore, many 
contingencies had CIMIC integrated as part 
of their force, then usually liaison officers 
or CIMIC officers. Consequently, the first 
Norwegian CIMIC team that left for Kabul 
in February 2003 was not entering a vacuum. 
The CIMIC presence on the ground was al-
ready substantial, and certain countries, in 
particular Finland, had managed to set a foot-
print on Cl!Vl!C execution in Afghanistan. 
The Norwegian CIMIC elements were respon-
sible for two districts in the north-western 
part of Kabul, Mir Bacha Kot and Shakadara 
and the two districts were part of the French 
area of responsibility. Mir Bacha Kot had 
approximately 100,000 inhabitants, whilst 
Shakadara had approximately 140,000. The 
front line between the Taliban regime and the 
Northern Alliance had cut straight through 
these districts, causing massive destruction. 
Geographically, the districts were not exten-
96 Ibid. 
97 Interview, 6 April 2005. 
sive, but the population density was high, 
as often ten people lived in every house. Mir 
Bacha Kot had approximately 30 villages, 
Shakadara about 40, and each of these had a 
"malik", a local village chief. 98 
Civil-military liaison 
To briefly recapitulate, Nato CIMIC doctrine 
anticipates the execution of six CIMIC tasks 
on the operational stage: communication, 
information exchange, coordination, facili-
tate agreements, CIMIC activities and asses-
sments, and that this will lead to the fulfilment 
of the three Nato CIMIC core functions. 
The first Nato CIMIC core function is civil-
military liaison, which aims to create the 
necessary coordination with civilian bodies. 
Establishing, promoting and maintaining 
coordination are perceived as preconditions 
for the other two CIMIC core functions. 
Liaison is also intended to garner the support 
of the national population, International 
Organisations (!Os) and NGOs. 99 
The three core functions are closelv 
intertwined, and certain activities may serv~ 
more than one function. Arguably, the CIMIC 
informants to a certain extent blended civil-
military liaison into the other two core 
functions, and this might explain why liaison, 
which is intended to be the most important 
core funcrion, was the least emphasised and 
elaborated by the CIM!C officers. The CIMIC 
informants seemed to agree that what the 
Norwegian CIMIC teams in Afghanistan did 
the most was support the civil environment. 
But as the CIMIC teams travelled around and 
collected data on the state of affairs in their 
disrricts, they developed an understanding of 
what happened and what the situation was 
like in that particular area, and hence this 
activity would simultaneously support the 
force. 100 
The CIMIC officers were asked to describe 
the course of a "regular day". It would start 
with a morning brief on which tasks were 
to be carried out during the day. Then the 
98 Interview, (j April2005. 
99 NATO, A]P-9 ... , article 104-a. 
100 Imcrvicw, 6 April2005. 
teams would drive out to the villages, usually 
with no appointment in advance due to 
security concerns. They would contact the 
district governors, civilian administrations 
or a "malik" with a needs assessment form 
covering the water, health, education, nutri-
tion, electricity situation etc. The CIMIC 
teams would also talk to people in the streets, 
and hand out the ISAF newspaper. Civilian 
organisations operating in the districts would 
be identified. Patrol reports would be made 
upon return to the camp. The aim was to 
form a correct and comprehensive picture 
of the situation in the districts and to map 
our local needs. The patrol reports would 
be delivered to the CIMIC Coordination 
Centre which would then try to assess where 
the needs were greatest in the area of ISAF 
operations. 101 After a period of time the 
Norwegian CIMIC elements became increas-
ingly preoccupied with identifying, facilitating 
and implementing projects. 
Coordination mechanisms are arguably 
mainly established during the early stages of 
deployment. After rotation, a new CIMIC 
elementshould be able to adopt and exploitthe 
channels that have already been established 
in the area of responsibility. The Norwegian 
CIMIC unit identified NGOs operating in its 
districts, and started building relations. Local 
power players were pinpointed, and formal 
contacts established. 111' Civil-military liaison, 
in terms of activities such as coordination 
and communication seem to have been 
important to the Norwegian CIMIC ele-
ments in Afghanistan. Relation building and 
sensitivity to local populations are arguably a 
trait of Norwegian peacekeeping traditions, 
and hence something which might easily be 
accomplished. 1113 Yet civil-military liaison 
101 CIJ\t1JC Group North ran the CI1v1IC Coordination 
Centre from Augu~r 2003, when Nato assumed 
leadership of ISAF. Norwegian CHvUC officers have 
been deployed to rhc CIMIC Coordination Centre 
in Kabul. Arguably, the intention that the CHvUC 
CoMdinnrion Centre should coordinate CUvllC 
and identify and concentrate the efforts where the 
needs \vcrc greatest did not m;_tterializc to the extent 
envisioned. 
]()2 Inrcrview, 13 ~lay 2005. 
103 Norwegian peacekeeping during the Cold War was 
considered part of rhe ''Nordic model". The reader is 
referred to Percr Viggo Jakobsen, Nordic AfJ!noacbes 
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implies setting up and maintammg a con-
structive web of relations and mechanisms 
to further coordination and coopcr;Hion in 
support of the military mission. The lnw pres-
ence of NGOs in the Norwegian districts was 
probably an impediment to effectil"l· liaison 
with civilian organisations. Liaison with 
local authorities seems to have hem good, 
but the question remains whether li.uson led 
to effective channels for communic.uion .md 
coordination that served the miliran· 1111"1on 
being set up. . 
Support to the civil environment 
Support to the civil environment refers ro the 
interaction with civilian bodies. It cmers a 
wide spectrum of activities and resources, 
such as information, material, equipment, 
training, communications and rr~ln..,porr 
facilities.lll4 \Y/e have already seen how 
CIMIC informants emphasized. that support 
to the civil environment was the most time-
consuming core function. The Norwegian 
CIMIC teams had daily contact with civilian 
players, and provided a range of resources 
and activities. 
In the two districts where the Norwegian 
CIMIC teams operated, there was a low 
presence of civilian organisations. Two 
NGOs did operate in the districts, namely the 
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan and the 
French Agency for Technical Cooperation 
and Development. 105 The Norwegian CIMIC 
officers did not seem to encounter any 
particular problems or reluctance when co-
operating with these civilian organisations in 
the field. One officer remarked: 
We had an ok relationship with them. 
On the tactical ground level, I did not 
experience any panicular difficulties 
when cooperating with humanitarian 
to Peace Operations. A new model in the nwking? 
(Roudedge, London and New York 2006), pp. 10. On 
UN peacekeeping during the Cold War: Age Ekncs, 
l;Ns (redsbeuarende operasjoner I UN peacekeeping 
operations] (Norsk Utenrikspolitisk lnstitutt, 1995}. 
104 NATO, A]P-9 ... , arride 104-b lists a wide range of 
conceivable military support. 
105 Agcnce d'aide a 1,1 cooperation technique et au 
development fACTED}. 
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organisations. 106 
The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan had 
been in the country for a long time. According 
to a CIMIC informant, efforts were made 
to draw on their background expertise to 
implement projects followed by common 
profiling when the project was finalized. The 
officer did not know how successful these 
efforts were due to rotation, but remarked 
on the willingness of the Swedish Committee 
for Afghanistan to be part of such an 
arrangement. 107 
An important CIMIC activity is to 
make assessments to provide the military 
commander with a means of examining the 
status of a specific area, 
... in order to identify critical shortfalls 
or capability gaps in the civil environ-
ment that may affect his mission, or 
that of the opposing force or forces. 108 
According to one CIMIC officer: 
It is important to make proper 
assessments. It is easy to go to the 
village chief and ask: what do you 
need? This approach lacks an essential 
focus: what makes this good for ISAF? 
The Norwegians sometimes fell in this 
rrap.l(l\1 
Projects might be categorized under the 
umbrella-CIMIC task of "CIMIC activities", 
and may help fulfil the core functions of 
support to the civil environment and support 
to the force. Nato states the following 
concerning CIMIC execution of projects: 
Projects must be in support of the 
commander and the mission. The 
commander must sanction any 
amendments to the project or its 
emphasis when they do not conform 
to the military mission. This may not 
alwavs be in concert with the aims of 
some or all of the civil actors involved 
106 Interview, 6 April2005. 
107 Interview, 9 Jvlny 2005. 
I OS Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 
Cl AHC tactics, teclmiques and procedures, Allied 
Command Operations manual, number 86-1-1, article 
2-1. 
109 Interview, 3 !Vlarch 2006. 
with the project. Nonetheless, "mission 
creep" must be avoided. Projects should 
not be undertaken unless they support 
the military mission. When possible, the 
military should eo-opt civilian agencies 
to complete projects that meet the 
military requirements. 110 
The Norwegian CIMIC unit was increasingly 
preoccupied with projects in Afghanistan. 
The projects were financed by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) budget for 
humanitarian activities, and the Norwegian 
CIMIC unit had been granted five million 
Norwegian kroner. All projects needed 
approval from the MFA. In reality, this 
meant approval from the embassy in Kabul, 
which received all project proposals and cost 
calculations. The embassy would send it to 
the MFA, but usually, if the project were 
approved by the embassy, it would also 
be approved by the MFA. The Ministry of 
Defence and the MFA had drawn up some 
criteria on which projects were to be launched, 
including schooling, education, health and 
small infrastructure programmes. Approval 
implied that the project was thematically 
placed within this frame. After a project 
had been approved, a tendering process was 
initiated by inviting firms to tender estimates. 
The CIMIC Coordination Centre would func-
tion as a project organisation which made the 
specifications, deals, contracts and so on, and 
then it was mostly the CIMIC teams who fol-
lowed up the projects. During the one-year 
period, the Norwegian CIMIC unit carried 
out a number of projects, such as building 
five schools, establishing medical clinics and 
female dressmaking workshops, donating 
school material and medical supplies, build-
ing wells and restoring qanat water arteries, 
establishing a patient shuttle from the villages 
to the Norwegian and Dutch surgical hospital 
units in Kabul, securing water supplies and 
vaccinating cattle. 
The Norwegian CIMIC elements seem 
to have been much focused on activities sup-
porting the civil environment. Projects may 
be part of such CIMIC efforts, but are not 
110 SHAPE, Cl AliC tactics, techniques and {Jmcedures, 
article 5-3c. 
prescribed to be the main effort in Nato 
C!MIC. CIMIC is not supposed to perform 
nation building, and projects lacking a focus 
on mission primacy may be connected to 
nation building activities. 111 The Norwegian 
CIM!C unit was involved with both immedi-
ate humanitarian and more development-
related projects. This is in line with the Nato 
C!MIC doctrine: 
CIMIC activities mav have to be 
conducted to fill any. vacuum in the 
provision of services or facilities re-
quired to meet the immediate life 
sustaining needs of the local population 
and/or to ensure the stability and long-
term sustainability of rhe society ... 112 
The question is what kind of effect in terms 
of support to the mission the Norwegian 
CIMIC elements acquired for example by 
establishing female dressmaking workshops 
and building schools. According to one of-
ficer, the CIMIC-path ventured upon was 
... nor related to the military mission in 
Afghanistan. It \vas advantageous to 
the local population but lacked military 
gains. 11.l 
The Norwegian Cl MIC elements did support 
the civil environment as such in their work, 
but seemingly lost track of the greater mission 
framework. 
Support to the force 
The Nato CIMlC core function of support 
to the force suggests that CIMIC plays a 
major role in achieving civilian support in the 
operational theatre. The force may be partly 
dependenr on civilian in formation and resour-
ces, and commanders will seek as much tacit 
support as possible. 114 By being present on 
the ground, having constant interaction with 
both authorities and ordinary locals, assessing 
111 j.\X'. Rollins clahoratcs on N.no and nation building 
in "Civil-~v1ilirary Coopn.Hion (CI.7\-!IC) in Crisis 
Rcspon~c Operations: The Implications for NATO", 
]11temational Peacckcepi11g, Vol. 8, No. 1, {London: 
Frank Cass, Spring 2001 ), pp. 122-129. 
112 NATO, A}l'-9 ... , article 302.3-c. 
1 13 Interview, 23 Augu:.r 2005. 
114 NATO, A}P-9 ... , article 104-c. 
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needs and perhaps by launching projects 
based on the needs' assessments, support 
to the force will be obtained via good will. 
This reflects the "winning hearts and minds" 
thinking. According to one informant, sup-
port to the force implies the national popu-
lation becoming willing to improve the ability 
of the international military force to reach 
the end-state. 115 
Operating in the French area of responsi-
bility, the Norwegian CIMIC elements were 
supposed to support the French in the first 
instance, and then ISAF. This was not easily 
accomplished, as a CIMIC-oflicer explains: 
\Xle worked a lot on our own. In other 
areas the CIMIC units were more inte-
grated into the force. Ideally, we should 
have been integrated into the French 
contingent and worked more directly 
for them, not on the outside. Then we 
would be able to support the force in 
a better manner at the same time as 
they could provide security for us in 
cases where it might be called upon. 
Occasionally we wished for a stronger 
attachment, also believing that it would 
be more secure for us if we had back 
up. Yet we did get support in special 
situations! and we could certainly not 
drive around with armoured vehicles 
in front and behind us for protection 
at all times. That would have sent out 
completely wrong signals. 11 6 
One CIMIC officer stated that his element 
spent half of its time on civil-military liai-
son and the remaining half on activities sup-
porting the civil environment. Accordingly, 
the informant suggests that his element did 
not support the force at all. The fact that the 
Norwegian CIMIC elements did not live with 
the French was an impediment according to 
the officer, as social relations are of the es-
sence to be able to cooperate. He continued: 
We were meant to support the French 
and ISAF, but we supported ISAF in 
lack of relations with the French. On the 
other hand, did we primarily support 
ISAF or were we busy spending MFA 
money?I17 
115 lntervie\v, 3 ivbrch 2006'. 
116. Interview, 6. April 2005. 
117 Interview, 13 Atay 2005. 
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The Norwegian CIMIC elements in 
Afghanistan did not seem to be dependent on 
civilian resources. Hence, achieving support 
to the force was a matter of obtaining civili-
an information and tacit support. Arguably, 
the Norwegian elements did gain some sup-
port for the force through activities more 
related to civil-military liaison and support 
to the civil environment. Yet the focal point 
here is that the increased focus on projects 
apparently did not result in support to the 
force. Several CIMIC officers questioned the 
support to the force-effect by doing certain 
projects. This created a sense that what the 
Norwegian CIMIC elements were doing was 
in fact "not CIMIC". In the words of one 
officer: 
I am uncertain whether it helped win 
the hearts and minds of the Afghans. 
We did a lot of good work, and what 
we did we did very well, but we did 
not do the right things. This was not 
CIMIC.'" 
Why was there a Norwegian approach to 
CIMIC in Afghanistan? 
The CIMIC informants seemed conscious 
that their mission in Afghanistan increasingly 
had been executed in the "project window". 
To some, this realisation evolved after retur-
ning to Norway. Certain CIMIC informants 
approved of the project-oriented CIMIC 
approach, whilst others dismissed it. In 
the following sections I shall examine a set 
of possible explanations why Norwegian 
CIMIC, in its project-oriented approach and 
lack of focus on mission primacy, diverged 
from the Nato CIMIC doctrine. 
Political i11centives 
The armed forces are a political instrument, 
and an implement in the foreign-policy 
toolbox. 119 Consequently, the Norwegian 
11 S Interview, 6 April2005. 
119 According rojonas Gahr Store, former Secretary 
General of the Norwegian Red Cross: "I prefer eo 
call it political~humanirarian relations rather than 
civil-military relations. Humanitarian organizations 
<HC but one of many civilian elements, and the 
CIMIC unit in Afghanistan might have been 
subjected to political pressures, providing 
superior directions on CIMIC execution. An 
article examining the effects of civil-military 
interactions in peace operations launches a 
number of causes why soldiers increasingly 
tend to become involved in humanitarian 
work. One of these causes is "a desire from 
governments to promote a positive image of 
their armies engaged in peacekeeping duties 
overseas". 120 The study continues to argue 
that: 
The image of a soldier with a child in 
his arms will attract more sympathy 
back home than the coverage of most 
military actions he might undertake. 
It will generate support in the public 
opinion that can considerably ease 
possible opposition against overseas 
military deployment. At a time when 
media (the so-called "CNN-factor") 
play a central part in shaping foreign 
policy, governments can be tempted 
ro encourage the active participation 
of their soldiers in humanitarian 
operations. 111 
There seems to have been a common under-
standing within the Norwegian CIMIC ele-
ments of certain expecrations linked to their 
deployment from the political authorities back 
home in Norway. As one officer remarked: 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs most 
probably expected it, and the political 
authorities certainly expected that as we 
went down with CIMIC elements, we 
would do projects to put the Norwegian 
flag on display. 122 
One officer stated: 
I may be na"ive, bur I would claim that 
Norway did not have a national agenda. 
military is indeed only one among several political 
instruments,.,. Swre: "In the new types of conflict we 
face, how ro define and defend humanitarian space?", 
The Norwcgi,'ln Atlantic Committee's 40'" annual 
Lcangkollcn Conference, the Nobel Institute, 31 
January lOOS, 
120 Joellc Jenny, "Civil-i\·1ilitary Cooperation in Complex 
Emergencies: Finding \X'ays to ]\.fake it \Vork", 
Europe.rn Securif)', Volume 10, Number 2 (London: 
Frnnk Cass, Summer 2001), p. 27. 
111 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
122 Interview, 9 .May 2005. 
But, of course, by using the Norwegian 
flag, then we did, we could have chosen 
to do ISAF projects and downscale the 
national, but then again no one did 
thar.l23 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, via the 
embassy, acted as the relevant authority 
for the Norwegian C!MlC elements. "The 
Ministry of Defence did not wish to steer 
CIMIC", claimed one officer, and continu-
ed: "Political concession was granted to 
the Ministry of Foreign Aifairs." 124 Asked 
whether Norwegian C!MIC work was suc-
cessful in Afghanistan, one CIMIC officer re-
plied: 
Successful, yes, when we received money, 
but it was far out in the project window, 
and it is dangerous to do that too often, 
as it sends a signal to politicians about 
a "feel-good" thing, where the military 
focus is lost. J.H 
This officer warns against the temptation 
of using CIMIC as a foreign policy tool to 
such a degree that the focus on the military 
mission is endangered. 
Perhaps the Norwegian CIMIC elements 
felt committed to doing activities which were 
not in accordance with the CIMIC doctrine 
due to the five million Norwegian kroner 
granted.'16 One CIMIC officer warns against 
the incremental development of CIMIC into 
a "half-military NGO", due to the domes-
tic political authorities being tempted to 
provide "guidelines" on CIMIC activities 
not in conjuncture with the Nato CIMIC 
doctrine. 127 The criteria agreed upon by the 
Ministry of Foreign Aifairs and the Ministry 
of Defence (such as schooling, education, 
health and small infrastructure programmes) 
do not necessarily go beyond the Nato 
CIMIC prescriptions. But with the Ministry 
of Foreign Aifairs in charge of project ap-
provals, one might question whether the prin-
ciple of mission primacy was taken into con-
sideration. One CIMIC officer highlighted 
113 Interview, 6 April2005. 
]24 Interview, 1 June 2005. 
'115 Inren·icw, 13 ~tay 2005. 
126 lmcrvicw, 13 ,\:lay 2005. 
127 lnren'icw, 13 ,\tar 1005. 
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the difficulties, due to differing national 
economic presuppositions, of adopting the 
doctrine entirely. Ideally all means would be 
ch.ulllelled through Nato and then out to the 
operational theatres. But this was hardlv at-
tain;lhle, the officer suggested, as it w~)uld 
he h.1rd for political authorities to grant 
money to C!MIC efforts if forces from other 
t..:ounrries were to spend them. 128 
~ational interests have occasionally 
left their imprint on CIMIC work. Certain 
countries have been especially eager to ex-
ploit CL'vliC to serve national interests. 
According to one CIMIC officer, France is 
renowned for usingCIMIC to further national 
agendas."" In fact, France is quite frank 
about this inclination. The French CIMIC 
concept adds a fourth core function, which 
is support of national interests, claiming 
that, "Considering national interests within 
a multinational framework is accepted by 
every nation." 1311 The French support of 
national interest consists of "preparing the 
potential deployment of French state assets", 
"supporting the implementation and action 
of diplomatic missions" and "providing sup-
port to French con1panies" .131 This serves 
as an illustration of the various national ap-
pro,Khes to CIMIC within Nato ranks. 
The Norwegian CIMIC contribution in 
Afghanistan cannot be considered devoid of 
a national agenda. The Norwegian CIMIC 
unit W•ls a visible contribution, particularly 
due to projects and the consequent "flagging" 
of such. National financing made it possible 
to concentrate efforts in the Norwegian dis-
tricts. The fact that the armed forces must 
be considered a foreign policy tool, and ac-
cordingly subjected to political incentives, 
helped steer the Norwegian CIMIC elements 
further into the project window, and made a 
direct impact on mission execution. 
128 Interview, 9 :-.L1y 2005. 
129 Interview, 9 Al.nch 2006. 
·1 JO Ddeg:nion ,l ['information et ii In communication de 
b deh:nsc, Thl.' French arml.'d forces ,md Cit,.il-A,fihtary 
Coojh'r,lfJ(m (C/Af!C), DICoD Creation (October 
2005), [nn!inc 10 June 2006], p. 9. 
131 !hid. 
24 IFS Info 5/2006 
The Finnish Cl MIC concept 
Certain CIMIC officers argued that the main 
reason for the discrepancy between the Nato 
CIMIC doctrine and mission execution was 
the fact that Cll'v!IC in Afghanistan was very 
much influenced by the Finnish concept of it. 
As one C!MIC-officer said: 
The reason why we did what we did in 
Afghanistan, I would claim, is that it 
was a well established procedure upon 
our arrival. And I would also claim 
that such project-oriented CIMIC is 
very much a Finnish legacy, as they ran 
CIMIC from the beginning, and their 
CIMIC policy is very project-oriented. 
In my opinion, this is not CIMIC. 132 
A path, presumably designed by the 
Finnish, had already been laid out before 
the Norwegian CIMIC-unit's arrival. The 
Norwegian elements continued along this 
path, with the other CIMIC elements un-
der the !SAF structure. Finland, with fifty 
personnel stationed, was the greatest CIMIC 
contributor to ISAF during the Norwegian 
deploymenr.U3 In August 2003, Finland as-
sumed command of the ISAF CIMIC branch, 
just as Nato assumed command of ISAF. It 
seems most likely that Finland would be able 
to exert operational influence after having as-
sumed command of ISAF CIMIC. Yet several 
informants deployed to Afghanistan prior 
to August 2003 suggested that the project-
oriented CIMIC approach was due greatly to 
Finnish influence. Accordingly, the Finnish 
seem to have had an impact on CIMIC execu-
tion prior to August 2003 as well. 
Finland is not a member of Nato and thus 
not obliged to follow the Nato CIMIC doc-
trine. Yet Finland is a partner in the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and 
the Nato CIMIC doctrine is assigned as a 
combined Nato/EAPC document. In the 
Basic Document for the EAPC, the follow-
ing is stated: " ... Partners will be able to de-
cide for themselves the level and areas of 
cooperation with NATO" to maintain self-
132 Interview, (j April2005. 
133 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations ... , 
p. 136. 
differentiation. 134 Consequently, the EAPC 
framework does not commit Finland to adop-
ting the Nato CIMIC doctrine. 
The Finnish Chief of Defence in a recent 
publication identifies CIMIC as a Finnish niche 
capacity. 135 He argues that the requirement for 
experienced CIMIC personnel was the reason 
why Finland deployed a CIMIC detachment 
to ISAF in January 2002. Further: "We have 
learned that our CIMIC concept also works 
in ISAF, but the implementation has to be ad-
justed to the situation and culture." 136 The 
Chief of Defence does not elaborate on the 
Finnish CIMIC concept in detail, but states 
that, 
In the Finnish CIMIC concept, 
specialists are used to provide assistance 
and manage reconstruction efforts, bur 
do not actuallv do the work. The aim 
is to encourag~ locals to learn by doing 
and help themselves ... '" 
The Finnish CIMIC concept seems to empha-
sise the facilitator role of CIMIC, and the 
'help-to-self-help' idea. This does not conflict 
with the Nato CIMIC concept. What is note-
worthy about what he says is that mission 
primacy is not mentioned. 
Substantial Finnish CIMIC experiences, 
expertise and presence probably enabled 
the Finnish to exert influence on CIMIC exe-
cution in ISAF. As one observer claims: 
Finland has created an effective CIMIC 
model, and Finnish CIMIC contingents 
have gained a reputation for being 
among the best in the field."' 
The suggested, profound project-orientation 
of the Finnish CIMIC concept has not been 
documented. Yet certain traits seem to have 
opened a window of opportunity: 
134 Naro, D.lsic Document of the Emo-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (Sintra Portugal, 30 .\Jay 1~97), 
{Nato [onlinc 1 June 2006]}. 
135 juhani Kaskeala, "From Traditional Peacekeeping to 
Srabilbarinn and Reconstruction Operations", Military 
Operations Today, RUSI Defence Systems (Spring 
2006), [onlinc 5 July 2006]. 
136 Ibid .• p. 77. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Jakobscn, Nordic Approaches to Peace OfJerations ... , 
p. 3. 
Another strongpoim of the Finnish 
model is the ready availability of 
considerable funds for CIMIC projects 
and procedures allowing for their quick 
dispersal. 139 
It is credible that the Finnish CIMIC model 
had a direct impact on Norwegian CIMIC 
in Afghanistan by strengthening the project-
oriented approach. 
The Bomz Agreement 
The Agreement on provisional arrangements 
in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment 
of permanent government institutions, known 
as the Bonn Agreement, was signed on 5 De-
cember 2001. The Bonn Agreement is an at-
tempt to map out the future of Afghanistan. 
Two CIMJC informants emphasised that the 
Bonn Agreement allows military forces to per-
form projects.'"' As one claimed: 
1t is srated in the Bonn Agreement that 
military forces may do nation building, 
and hence it was legitimate per definition 
that the forces engaged in the kind of 
support they did in Afghanistan. 141 
The following formulation in the Bonn 
Agreement provides room for the international 
security force to carry out certain projects: "It 
would also be desirable if such a force were 
to assist in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan's 
infrastructure." 1" This narrow formulation 
might have provided ISAF with a opening 
for military forces to do civilian related 
work. In this context "rehabilitation" and 
"infrastructure" are keywords in need of a 
definition by ISAF. The CIMIC informants 
are unclear whether the Bonn Agreement sup-
posedly opens up for projects exempt from 
the principle of mission primacy. The word 
'"nation building", which one informant uses, 
might imply that the projects do not require 
a clear view on mission primacy. Despite the 
fact that two C!MIC informants stressed the 
opemng in the Bonn Agreement, it turned 
139 Ibid. 
140 Inn:r\'iew, 23 August 2()()j and 9 ~brch 2006. 
141 Inren•icw, 9 ~Llrch 2006. 
142. The Bonn Agreement, (Afghan Government !onlinc 4 
May 2.006/l, Annex 1, article 4. 
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out hard to pinpoint the actual formulation. 
Would Norwegian CIMIC in Afghanistan 
have been project-oriented only due to the 
provision in the Bonn Agreement? It seems 
credible that the Bonn Agreement played an 
intermediary part, strengthening the direct 
impacts of political incentives and the Finnish 
CIMIC model. The provision of the Bonn 
Agreement provides room for interpretations. 
Given the impact of political incentives and 
the Finnish CIMIC model, it was natural ro 
interpret the provision in terms of opening 
up for projects beyond mission primacy. 
Few NGOs in the Norwegian districts 
That few NGOs were present in the Nor-
wegian districts offers another possible 
explanation for the project-oriented approach 
to CIMIC by the Norwegians. Perhaps it was 
natural for the Norwegian CIMIC teams to 
take projects upon themselves in the absence 
of humanitarian organisations? One CIMIC 
officer denied this: 
Well, it is not na rural. CIMIC is not 
project work, our job is w establish and 
maintain contact, liaise, map out the 
situation, and point our which needs 
might be present in certain areas. And 
then, ideally, other organisations are 
meant to go in and do the projects. 143 
Another officer stressed that being able to gain 
information about the humanitarian situa-
tion may be very hard if the local population 
does not believe that they will receive some-
thing back in terms of projects. 144 With few 
NGOs operating in the districts, the local 
population might have turned to the militarY 
with this request. As the ICRC study argues": 
A widely held opinion within the mili-
tary is that, irrespective of their man-
date, the local population will expect 
peace-keepers to help meet their 
needs, particularly in situations where 
humanitarian ~rganizations alone 
cannot cope. 14s 
143 Interview, 6 April2005. 
144 Interview, 9 .Mar 2005. 
145 Studcr, '"The Ici\C and civil-military relations ... ", p. 
378. 
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The reason why there were such few civilian 
organisations operating in the two districts 
is unknown, but it might have distorted the 
ideal division of labour and moved the activi-
ties of Norwegian CIMIC further into the 
"project window". I do not anticipate that 
the presence of few NGOs in the Norwegian 
districts directly influenced the Norwegian 
CIMIC approach. Rather, it strengthened the 
direct influence of political incentives and the 
Finnish CIMIC model. 
American legacy 
Another suggestion is that project-oriented 
CIMIC is in part an American legacy. The 
Nato CI\1IC doctrine may be viewed as a 
European edition of the doctrine, which is put 
under increasing pressure from the Americans. 
One informant stated that the Nato doctrine 
is in itself conservative and easy for civilian 
players to accept. 146 The American Civil Af-
fairs concept focuses on nation building. 
Certain Civil Affairs activities are similar to 
Nato CJMIC, but in general Civil Affairs is 
much broader, and it may be imprinted with 
a national agenda. CIMIC is not meant to 
perform nation building, but is supposed to 
support the Nato Commander. Despite the 
fact that Nato might be moving closer to-
wards nation building activities and taking a 
more holistic view to operations, CIMIC will 
not equal Civil Affairs. 147 
Civil Affairs were operating in Afghanistan 
when the Norwegian CIMIC elements were 
deployed. It has not been established whe-
ther Civil Affairs had any impact on the 
Norwegian CIMJC-units' approach to their 
mission. Perhaps potential American impact 
could rather be anticipated on a political-
strategic level, e.g. influencing the framing 
of the conceptual aspect of Nato CJMIC in 
future documents. 
The "feel and do good syndrome" 
The study asking why soldiers increasingly 
tend to become involved in humanitarian 
146 lnrcrvlew, 3 June 2005. 
147 Interview, 31\hrch 2006. 
work also proposes the following grounds: "a 
very understandable desire of peacekeepers 
to help the local population in the theatre of 
operation where they are deployed" .1" Later, 
the study stresses that "the "feel-good" effect 
on the morale of soldiers when providing aid 
to civilians cannot simply be discarded". 149 
A "feel and do good syndrome", or per-
haps "Santa Claus syndrome", was not ex-
plicitly cited by any of the informers as an 
explanation for the Norwegian approach to 
CIMIC in Afghanistan. HO Yet it should be ad-
ded as a possible explanation due to the easy 
inclination towards doing good which might 
appear in peacekeeping operations. This 
inclination might be particularly pressing 
for officers provided with both means and 
possibility, such as the Norwegian CIMIC 
elements were. 
One CJMIC officer emphasised the lack 
of a clear dividing line between humanitarian 
aid on one hand and, on the other, military 
support to the civil environment and support 
to the force. The informant continued to 
question whether there should be a clear 
dividing line. A common purpose is to help 
the nation, and the result of projects is a 
win-win situation for both the military and 
the civilian population, according to the 
officer. 151 This officer also suggested that the 
Norwegian CJMIC efforts in Afghanistan 
were more directed towards winning the 
hearts of the local civilians, and not so much 
their minds. 152 As another informant claims: 
The CIMIC mission was very successful. 
It was very narrow, too narrow, and 
needs to be further developed. Bur we 
spent our money, and I disagree that it is 
wrong for men in green to use assistance 
means. It is important for the military 
to support the civil environment. !53 
Perceived success in accomplishment might 
go hand in hand with the feeling of having 
done something meaningful. Different percep-
148 Jenny, "Civil-!vlilitary Cooperation in Complex 
Emergencies ... "', p. 26. 
149 rb;d. 
!50 lntcrvkw, 23 Augusr 2005. 
151 lmcrvicw, 3 ,\~larch 2006. 
152 Interview, 3 ,\.-!arch 2006. 
153 Interview, 1 June 1005. 
rions of CIMIC created variations in under-
srandings of success and meaning. 154 Infor-
mants have not mentioned any direct impact 
from the so-called "feel-and-do-good" syn-
drome on Norwegian CIMIC execution in 
Afghanistan. 
Conclusion 
Each unique conflict requires a specially 
designed response from the international 
community. This is also true for civil-military 
cooperation and coordination, which need 
to be adjusted tO the conflict scenario at 
hand. Consequently, an elastic CIMIC con-
cept, such as the one presently endorsed by 
Nato, is called for. However, the flexible 
Nato C!MIC concept gives rise to certain con-
ceptual ambiguities and challenges vis-a-vis 
CIMIC execution in international operations. 
Two such challenges are found in the various 
national approaches ro C!J\1!C on the opera-
tional stage, and the lack of a common under-
standing of the concept. Another is the elusive 
demarcation between where military tasks 
end and those of civilians begin. Are Nato 
CIMIC officers supposed to act like soldiers 
or saints? Should they stick to the military 
mindset of mission primacy, or also be able 
to venture into the civilian-humanitarian 
field if the opportunity arises and means al-
low for it? Nato Cli\IlC calls for soldiers, not 
saints. It calls for humane soldiers, but not 
hun1anitarians. 
Norwegian C!MIC aspires to follow the 
Nato C!MIC doctrine. In this article I have 
argued rhat despite this aspiration, a Nor-
wegian approach emerged during the Nor-
wegian Cl MIC deployment ro Afghanistan in 
2003-04 which cannot on certain counts be 
equated with the provisions of Nato CIMIC. 
Several aspects of the Norwegian efforts in 
Afghanistan were in conjuncture with Nato 
154 IHrd ,\txbnd, Sbdcslwtt idt'il!ismc: norsk 
o/{isasmomlz 1\.osOJ'O [\X'oundctl idealism: Norwegian 
offi:crs morale in Kosom[ {ikrgcn, Eidc, 1004}, 
proposes the bhcl '·hw11.1nitari,111 military" to build a 
bridge between '"'humamrari;tn" anJ "military", in an 
attempt tO create a professional ~elf-image and identity 
for soiJicrs which might ;lbsorh the !>earch for mt:aning 
in service abroad. 
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CIMIC, but Norwegian CIMIC also entered a 
project-oriented path, which implies that pro-
jects, which were not necessarily in support 
of the military mission, increasingly became 
the main activity. 
Why then did the Norwegian CIMIC unit 
go for the "project window" in Afghanistan 
at the expense of the imperative principle of 
mission primacy? Six possible explanations 
have been examined. Two of the explanations 
seem to have had a direct impact on the 
Norwegian approach to CIMIC, whilst two 
others played more intermediary roles. The 
remaining two explanations apparently had 
less impact. First, available funds and direc-
tions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
seem to have had a strong direct impact on 
the Norwegian approach to CIMIC. The 
Norwegian CIMIC unit was granted five 
million Norwegian kroner, and felt obliged 
to spend this money on 'visible' projects. 
Arguably, the political incentives aimed at 
promoting the saints, and not necessarily the 
soldiers, to a number of audiences, including 
the Norwegian and Afghan populations. Se-
cond, the Finnish CilvHC model also seems 
to have had a strong and direct impact on 
the Norwegian, project-oriented CJMIC ap-
proach. An early and substantial Finnish 
CIMIC presence, of good repute, solid prior 
experiences and available funding enabled the 
Finnish to take a lead along the !SAF CIMIC 
path. The Norwegian CIMJC detachment 
followed this established path on arriving in 
Afghanistan. 
Third, the perceived opening in the Bonn 
Agreement had an intermediary impact 
on the Norwegian approach to CIMIC. 
Political incentives and the Finnish model 
had provided grounds for doing projects, 
and interpretations of the provision in the 
Bonn Agreement further strengthened this 
inclination. The Bonn Agreement has not 
been judged a comprehensive peace agree-
ment. Key provisions in a comprehensive 
agreement might exert more direct influence 
on mission execution. Fourth, the presence of 
few NGOs in the Norwegian districts is also 
believed to have had an intermediary impact, 
and may have strengthened the Norwegian 
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project-oriented approach. One could ask 
how a stronger NGO presence might have 
affected the outcome; perhaps it would have 
weakened the direct influence of political 
incentives and the Finnish model and have 
made the operational scene less disposed to 
project-oriented CJMJC. Fifth, impact from 
the American modus operandi of Civil Af-
fairs was not established. And sixth, the 
existence of the "feel and do good syndrome" 
with the Norwegian CIMIC officers has not 
been demonstrated, but at an individual le-
vel such a syndrome might have impeded a 
critical view of the projects undertaken by 
Norwegian CIMIC in Afghanistan. 
These six explanations are only a part of 
the puzzle. The ambiguities in the definition of 
the Nato CJMIC concept and the consequent 
weakness of such have not been examined as 
an explanation for the Norwegian CIMIC ap-
proach in Afghanistan. The Nato CJMIC con-
cept is not the product of a theoretical pro-
cess. Rather, it has evolved from military ex-
periences with the growing complexity of the 
civilian environment. The lack of theoretical 
stringency might have spurred the multitude 
of national approaches to CJMIC in inter-
national operations. A weak Naro CJMIC 
concept makes CIMIC execution subject to 
the impact of a number of sources. It enables 
a strong degree of political steering, but other 
factors are also allowed to intervene. 
Further, Norwegian CIMIC was not inte-
grated into a Norwegian contingent operating 
in a Norwegian area of responsibility. Neither 
was it integrated into the French contingency, 
which was responsible for the area in which 
Norwegian CIMIC operated. As one minis-
try official suggested: "CJMIC should be inte-
grated into the force rather than a unit of 20 
men. This was an experiment, and it was not 
successful, nor optimal." 155 Another official 
would not view CIMIC in Afghanistan as 
an experiment, but added that in the case 
of a new CIMIC deployment it would be 
sensible to attach it to a greater Norwegian 
contribution. 156 Whether CIMIC operates 
on the sidelines, or as an integrated part of 
155 Interview, 3 June 2005. 
156 Interview, 20 J•vlay 2005. 
a greater force-contribution, might also have 
an impact on mission execution. 
The Nato CIMIC concept provokes a 
number of questions and challenges, which 
need to be addressed while carving out an 
effective CIMIC concept. The principle of 
mission primacy appears as a focal point 
of definitional contention. But is mission 
primacy realistically achievable? Is it possible 
to avoid national agendas interfering with 
mission primacy? What are the ramifications 
of excluding the principle, such as in the 
British CJMIC definition? Studying national 
approaches to CIMIC in the field may reveal 
best practices and common mistakes and pro-
vide lessons that might inform the conduct of 
current and future operations. 157 
The development of an "enhanced CIMIC" 
concept is partly due to the experience of 
doing civil-related work without a clear view 
to mission primacy. "Enhanced CIMIC" is a 
working ritle for a concept which is intended 
to improve Nato's CJMIC capability. This 
concept is part of the Nato "effect-based 
approach to operations" concept (EBAO), 
which can be seen as a military perspective 
on the UN "integrated missions" concept. 
In short, the basic philosophy of the "effect-
based approach to operations" concept is 
the integrated use of all Nato instruments to 
achieve the right effects, in particular the right 
strategic effects, and reaching the end-state. 
Whether the concept of "enhanced CIMIC" 
will reconcile the inherent challenges in the 
Nato CIMIC concept remains to be seen. It 
also remains to be seen whether this concept 
is intended to supplement the present CIMIC 
concept, or possibly supplant it. 15S 
157 Douglas C. Lovc!nce.Jr. quoted in Thomas R . 
. Mockaitis, Cil'il·military cooperation in peace 
OjJL'ratio11s ... , p. iii. 
15 8 .Many thanks to Kjt:!l Ingc Bjcrga for constructive 
comments and good guidance on previous draft.s. 
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